Great Pacific War: A History of the American-Japanese Campaign of 1931-33 Read Online Free Page A

Fourthly, we should obtain new territories in the Pacific which, by reason of their admirable climate, fertility, and rich resources, would offer the best possible field for settlement by our surplus population.
    ‘I have now placed before you quite frankly the problem with which we are confronted, and would ask you to judge which of the two alternatives it is our duty to adopt; but before coming to a decision it would be advisable to hear the reports of the Ministers of Army and Navy.’
    Admiral Oshima, General Ofuji, and General Oka were then successively called upon to express their views, which generally confirmed the favourable account which the Premier had given of the outlook from the naval and military points of view. After a discussion lasting several hours all the Ministers, excepting only Mr. Sasaki (Home Affairs), agreed that a strong foreign policy offered the best means of uniting the nation and putting an end to the grave domestic troubles then in progress. Mr. Sasaki dissented, but expressed his readiness to resign if his views did not harmonise with those of the rest of the Cabinet. At this the meeting broke up, Prince Kawamura bidding his colleagues farewell with the significant words: ‘Gentlemen, the necessary steps will be taken to give effect to our common decision.’ At 6 p.m. secret orders were issued to put in force Sections 1, 2 and 4A of the War Emergency Plan.
    It should be noted in connection with the foregoing that, while Dr. Ikeda has incurred some odium in Japan by reason of his liberal opinions, his general veracity as an historian has never been questioned; and we may consequently accept his account of this fateful Cabinet meeting on January 5, 1931, as being in the main accurate.

 
    CHAPTER II
     
    Diplomatic correspondence preceding hostilities — Radio and cable communications interrupted — Dangerous weakness of United States Asiatic Squadron — Captain Appleton, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations Bureau, resigns as a protest — Japanese steamer blows up in Panama Canal, suspending communication between Atlantic and Pacific — Question of employing submarines against merchant vessels raised — Bad news of the Asiatic Squadron
    EVENTS now marched swiftly to their appointed end. Rioting continued in the capital and elsewhere during the 6th and 7th, and as the troops were repeatedly compelled to use their weapons, the tale of casualties mounted steadily. With Japan, as it seemed, on the verge of revolution, her friends and enemies alike waited breathlessly for the dénouement . But suddenly the whole complexion of affairs underwent a marked change. Speaking in the Diet on January 10, the Foreign Minister announced in solemn tones that a critical situation had arisen in China, the gravity of which was enhanced by the unlooked-for intervention of a third Power. Baron Fukuhara then reviewed the negotiations which had taken place with regard to the Sayers concession, reminded his hearers that the Chinese Government had lately adopted a tone which was difficult to reconcile with peaceful intentions and added: “In order to make our position quite clear we have informed the United States Government that, since the question at issue concerns only ourselves and China we do not propose to make the Sayers concession a subject of diplomatic negotiation with any other Power.” Appreciating to the full the significance of these words, the deputies gave way to patriotic fervour, their cheers quite drowning for the moment the tumult of the crowd which still surged about the precincts of the Diet.
    An hour or so later, when the evening papers appeared with a report of the Foreign Minister’s speech under flaring headlines, and the people read that little Japan had figuratively snapped its fingers under the nose of the American Colossus, they speedily verified the Premier’s prediction by forgetting all about those grievances which they had come out to ventilate. Serried masses of workmen