Even the Russian infantry were unable to launch an attack through those snows. Russian ski troops got nowhere. The Germans were supplied by the Luftwaffe. This means of supply, however, proved inadequate and, starting late in February, German forces assembled west of Staraya Russa to relieve the encircled forces at Demyansk.
The movement was effected by rail. The transport I travelled on arrived at Volot, about 30km west of Staraya Russa, on a clear winter afternoon. We could feel the cold, which was intense but not too unpleasant. Yet, all of a sudden, the men noticed the symptoms of frostbite on each other’s face. The mercury registered –35°C. While detraining, the sun went down; before complete darkness set in the sky turned a deep blue, like blue-black ink, and poured its colour over the virgin snow. With the disappearance of the sun a light breeze started up, hardly noticeable but incessant … Paths for sleighs and vehicles were laboriously shovelled through the snowfields, only to have long stretches buried again within a matter of hours by the evening wind. To make matters worse, we no sooner had detrained than marching troops and supply columns caused traffic jams. All of which adds up to the following lesson: prior to detraining large troop units, a detailed map of winter roads must be procured, for even the primitive Russian road network cannot be kept altogether clear of snow … The winter roads frequently do not follow the course of regular streets and roads.
The countryside was only sparsely settled; one must remember that the Russian peasant usually owns a single house rather than a group of farm buildings. Billets therefore became so scarce that troops had to be quartered even in houses occupied by Russian civilians. Their eviction would have meant certain death in that temperature. The German soldier did not do such things. The upshot was numerous cases of typhus, a disease transmitted by lice. Lice are found in many Russian homes.
Despite the weather, the Germans fought on. Two divisions of German riflemen, supported by twenty tanks and assault guns, were to attack across enemy-held territory in an attempt to reach the westernmost salient of the encircled German troops. Hoehne was with them:
The southern division had to traverse more than 2km of snow-blanketed plain, offering no cover whatever, in order to reach the enemy lines. That feat would have required hours, and merely the job of struggling through the powdery snow would have drained the infantrymen of all their physical strength. An attack conducted in this manner held no prospect of success, even if it were aimed at weak enemy forces. Tanks, for that matter, were likewise unable to manoeuvre in the powdery snow.
A page was therefore borrowed from the way the Russians had cut off Demyansk in their attack up the Lovat River. It was decided to launch an attack from the north, up the frozen Polizt River …
Conditions were more favourable for the division to the north. It had to aim at reaching two points that marked the beginning of Russian winter roads … Even in Germany the surfaces of heavily travelled roads occasionally crack, once the thaw follows a severe winter. The phenomenon is caused by the fact that heavy traffic deprives a road of the snow blanket that otherwise would protect it from the cold. The Russians close improved [paved] roads as soon as the winter freeze sets in and establish winter roads either alongside the regular right of way or simply straight through the countryside.
Snow was compressed by tanks, and water was poured on to give the road a smooth surface of ice. Snow fences also had to be built to stop the wind drifting snow across the road. There were other difficulties:
The infantry was equipped as follows: cotton-padded winter uniform (which unfortunately had not yet been available at the beginning of 1942); felt boots; and two small hand sleds per squad, loaded with blankets, two shelter halves per man, some