Nigel Cawthorne Read Online Free Page A

dry wood and some boughs. In addition, each platoon had two small trench stoves … Platoon tents were pitched; dug into the snow, they did not protrude above its surface. The floors of the tents were covered with boughs, over which the second shelter halves were spread for protection from the cold ground. A stove was set up at each end of every tent, and fires were started. The temperature in the tents was not uncomfortable … The pack animals were simply sheltered in pits dug into the snow alongside the winter roads. So long as the animals are protected from the wind, they can withstand temperatures even below –30°C … In the deep snow of the winter in question, any calibre smaller than 150mm was completely ineffective because the snow stopped the shell fragments. This was particularly true of mortar shells … Contrary to expectations, the mountain howitzer of the Jäger [Rifle] divisions proved to be highly effective, even though its calibre was only 75mm. By a great stroke of luck, eight per cent of the ammunition brought up for these pieces were armed with combination fuses. Most of the field fortifications which the Russian infantry had built into the snow were not splinterproof.
    After one attack in February failed, Hoehne and his men tried again:
    On the clear, frosty morning of 21 March the two divisions of Group Seydlitz went over to the attack. According to plan, the right division succeeded in cleaning out the stubbornly defended southern part of Ivanovskoye and rolled up the enemy positions west and east of the Polizt.
    Then things began to go wrong:
    Because of the dense underbrush the snow was so deep that the forest could not be used as flank protection … Enemy nests of resistance that had formed around battery positions could not be eliminated in the deep snow. Partly sparse and partly dense shrubbery, low in height and in most instances as thick as a man’s finger, had permitted the snow to pile up so high that the infantry sank into it up to their armpits. Without very thorough and careful artillery preparation, a continuation of the attack was out of the question. Aviation could not be used because of the difficulty in recognizing the front lines, nor could tanks be committed, since the Russians had failed to build a winter road to Invanovskoye from the east …
    A winter road in the direction of the Russian battery positions was begun at once. The entire engineer battalion, a sizeable unit to start with, was reinforced by approximately one thousand men for the purposes of this project. Nevertheless, building the winter road took almost twenty-four hours …
    The left division likewise effected the penetration into the enemy position according to plan. After enemy resistance had been broken, the attack towards the east was continued at once … The left regimental combat team thrust almost to the Staraya Russa–Ramsuhevo highway, but could not get possession of it. Here the attack stopped dead in its tracks. The right combat team pushed far beyond the enemy position … In the forest east of Svinushovo the attack slowed down because of the deeper snow and the increased enemy resistance … In hard fighting the combat team reached a point about halfway between Svinushovo and Bol’gorby. The woods, however, became more and more dense, so that on 23 March this attack also bogged down.
    The failure of a Russian counterattack – they were little better than the Germans at manoeuvring in snow – allowed the German offensive to resume. Now it was a race to advance down the winter roads before the thaw set in.
    On 4 April the mercury began to rise and the daytime registered temperatures above freezing. As a result, the infantry had much more easy going in the snow. Nevertheless, the onset of the thaw was one of the reasons for the failure of the attack. The few, largely obsolescent German tanks had become damaged and were out of action. Russian armour, on the other hand, began to move now that the snow