Find, Fix, Finish Read Online Free Page B
Author: Aki Peritz, Eric Rosenbach
the plot and bring the planners to justice.
Operation Overt is an excellent example of how the US finds and tracks potential threats, as well as how allied intelligence services can work together. It serves as a model case for both the US and UK in the prevention of large-scale terrorist attacks by demonstrating the importance of careful multinational intelligence work, robust information sharing, intricate diplomatic maneuvers, and good fortune. Operation Overt also instructs that solid detective work, long nights at the office, and luck—and not flashy counterterrorism actions or brutal methods—still serve as the primary mechanisms that thwart many terrorist acts.
THE FIRST TRIAL
In August, prosecutors charged the conspirators—Ali, Hussain, Sarwar, Muhammad Ghulzar, and six others—with various criminal offenses related to the failed airline plot. British prosecutors believed they had a good case against the defendants based on the assembled evidence even without the testimony of Rashid Rauf, who had escaped Pakistani police custody in December 2007 and disappeared. In addition to the chemicals and other bomb-making supplies that law enforcement had collected, the prosecution played the martyrdom videos as evidence of the plotters’ intent. Prosecutors also claimed that Assad Sarwar was simultaneously developing plans to cripple other sites in England as well as inflight airliners.
Although several of the bombers pled guilty to lesser charges such as conspiracy to commit public nuisance and conspiracy to cause explosions, they fought the more serious charges, including conspiracy to murder using explosives on aircraft and conspiracy to murder persons unknown. They claimed that they wanted to cause a spectacle to protest British and US foreign policy but did not want to kill anyone. Ali even claimed that the bombs were just meant to frighten people as part of a political statement.
On November 8, 2008, after deliberating fifty hours, a jury convicted Ali, Sarwar, and Hussein of conspiracy to murder, but—incredibly—acquitted them of the crime at the heart of the plot: conspiracy to murder using explosives on an aircraft. 73 British authorities immediately declared that they would seek a retrial of seven suspects on all previous counts, as well as the conspiracy to detonate improvised explosive devices on transatlantic passenger aircraft. Unique among them, Mohammad Gulzar was cleared on all counts.
Several procedural and evidentiary reasons account for why British authorities failed to fully convict the plotters during this trial. The main reason prosecutors could not make the case against the ringleaders for conspiracy to commit murder using explosives on aircraft was their inability to include electronic communication intercepts as evidence. They could not exploit critical GCHQ and NSA intercepts as evidence because the UK and US governments thought that Rauf—who was still at large in Pakistan—might once again access his mail.yahoo.com e-mail account and reveal his location. 74 In the eyes of the British and US governments, intelligence gathering and protection of sources and methods trumped prosecutors’ needs to make a convincing case based on all the evidence in open court.
CHAPTER 8
AN INCREASING PREFERENCE FOR LETHAL ENDS
Hell is empty, and all the devils are here.
—THE TEMPEST
B y the middle of the decade, the US had begun to shift strategically from capturing top al-Qaeda personnel to killing them. Technological dominance provided the US a critical advantage; mobile and satellite phone technology became increasingly fatal forms of communication and al-Qaeda personnel were forced to rely on human couriers and face-to-face meetings to transmit messages. Senior leaders were becoming so concerned about the risk of electronic interception that communication between remaining operational leaders became more and more restricted. US intelligence analysts were beginning
Operation Overt is an excellent example of how the US finds and tracks potential threats, as well as how allied intelligence services can work together. It serves as a model case for both the US and UK in the prevention of large-scale terrorist attacks by demonstrating the importance of careful multinational intelligence work, robust information sharing, intricate diplomatic maneuvers, and good fortune. Operation Overt also instructs that solid detective work, long nights at the office, and luck—and not flashy counterterrorism actions or brutal methods—still serve as the primary mechanisms that thwart many terrorist acts.
THE FIRST TRIAL
In August, prosecutors charged the conspirators—Ali, Hussain, Sarwar, Muhammad Ghulzar, and six others—with various criminal offenses related to the failed airline plot. British prosecutors believed they had a good case against the defendants based on the assembled evidence even without the testimony of Rashid Rauf, who had escaped Pakistani police custody in December 2007 and disappeared. In addition to the chemicals and other bomb-making supplies that law enforcement had collected, the prosecution played the martyrdom videos as evidence of the plotters’ intent. Prosecutors also claimed that Assad Sarwar was simultaneously developing plans to cripple other sites in England as well as inflight airliners.
Although several of the bombers pled guilty to lesser charges such as conspiracy to commit public nuisance and conspiracy to cause explosions, they fought the more serious charges, including conspiracy to murder using explosives on aircraft and conspiracy to murder persons unknown. They claimed that they wanted to cause a spectacle to protest British and US foreign policy but did not want to kill anyone. Ali even claimed that the bombs were just meant to frighten people as part of a political statement.
On November 8, 2008, after deliberating fifty hours, a jury convicted Ali, Sarwar, and Hussein of conspiracy to murder, but—incredibly—acquitted them of the crime at the heart of the plot: conspiracy to murder using explosives on an aircraft. 73 British authorities immediately declared that they would seek a retrial of seven suspects on all previous counts, as well as the conspiracy to detonate improvised explosive devices on transatlantic passenger aircraft. Unique among them, Mohammad Gulzar was cleared on all counts.
Several procedural and evidentiary reasons account for why British authorities failed to fully convict the plotters during this trial. The main reason prosecutors could not make the case against the ringleaders for conspiracy to commit murder using explosives on aircraft was their inability to include electronic communication intercepts as evidence. They could not exploit critical GCHQ and NSA intercepts as evidence because the UK and US governments thought that Rauf—who was still at large in Pakistan—might once again access his mail.yahoo.com e-mail account and reveal his location. 74 In the eyes of the British and US governments, intelligence gathering and protection of sources and methods trumped prosecutors’ needs to make a convincing case based on all the evidence in open court.
CHAPTER 8
AN INCREASING PREFERENCE FOR LETHAL ENDS
Hell is empty, and all the devils are here.
—THE TEMPEST
B y the middle of the decade, the US had begun to shift strategically from capturing top al-Qaeda personnel to killing them. Technological dominance provided the US a critical advantage; mobile and satellite phone technology became increasingly fatal forms of communication and al-Qaeda personnel were forced to rely on human couriers and face-to-face meetings to transmit messages. Senior leaders were becoming so concerned about the risk of electronic interception that communication between remaining operational leaders became more and more restricted. US intelligence analysts were beginning
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