Find, Fix, Finish Read Online Free Page A

remained beyond the reach of American and Iraqi forces for years while his group engaged in some of the most gruesome terror attacks against civilian targets in recent memory.
    The hunt for Zarqawi was characterized by numerous near misses. Before the US invaded Iraq, the failure to neutralize Zarqawi was largely political. The Pentagon had actionable intelligence on Zarqawi’s whereabouts, but was held back by the White House out of a need to build support for the impending conflict. Following the invasion until mid-2005, most near misses stemmed from poor operational planning, thin intelligence, conflicting military objectives, and bad luck. During this time, Zarqawi demonstrated an evolving understanding of the US approach to capturing or killing him; over time, he and his henchmen learned to improve their personal operational security while exploiting weaknesses in the US approach. Zarqawi commanded support in key parts of the local Sunni populace and benefited from the foreign fighters flowing into Iraq, using them for protection and cover, as well as a force multiplier for his terrifying suicide operations.
    Besides demonstrating the challenges faced by US forces, the story behind Iraqi, Jordanian, British, and US attempts to find, fix, and finish a terror leader like Zarqawi provides a compelling case study in the importance and the complexities of integrating human intelligence and military resources in conducting counterterrorism operations in a war zone. It also raises questions about the role of technology in intelligence gathering, as well as the possibilities for cooperation with foreign intelligence services. Finally, the hunt for Zarqawi shows that a small group of vicious, committed killers can destabilize a country.

CHAPTER 7
     
    BOJINKA REDUX
     
    The Need for Good International Cop Work
     
     
     
     
     
     
    D uring the summer of 2005, London was on a knife edge. British citizens caught up in the nihilist ideology of al-Qaeda had twice attacked the bus and subway networks, killing dozens and bringing the horror and mayhem of international terrorism to the city’s 7.5 million residents. Even the decades-long struggle with the Provisional Irish Republican Army paled in comparison. Al-Qaeda changed the equation; the point was not just to scare the British people but also to cause carnage in the name of religious ideals. And, in a video released after the July 7 bombings, the plot’s ringleader, Mohammad Siddique Khan, promised more attacks:
    Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people all over the world, and your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters. Until we feel security, you will be our targets, and until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment, and torture of my people, we will not stop this fight. 1
     
    Al-Qaeda’s follow-up plot to the gruesome July transit attacks was even more daring and complicated: to destroy several transatlantic airliners in midflight, over American cities using a concoction of homemade chemicals. These acts of terror would kill several thousand civilians, cost billions of dollars, strain the Anglo-American relationship, bankrupt several airlines, severely damage the global civil aviation system, and cause untold ripples on the global economy.
    But it never happened. The complicated plot involving dozens of individuals in multiple countries—dubbed Operation Overt by British authorities—was thwarted through the intimate cooperation of Britain, Pakistan, and America, as well as the largest surveillance operation in British history. Over a thousand British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS; a.k.a. MI6) agents, British Security Service (BSS; a.k.a. MI5) agents, undercover Metropolitan Special Branch officers, Thames valley police officers, and other officials worked for over a year with their US counterparts to crush