Find, Fix, Finish Read Online Free
Author: Aki Peritz, Eric Rosenbach
Pope John Paul II. KSM was a one-man terrorist wrecking ball.
While a number of his colleagues, such as Mohammad Atef, met fiery ends courtesy of missiles launched from overhead aerial platforms, KSM was captured alive, allowing US authorities to use newly expanded national security tools such as rendition, enhanced interrogation techniques, and military commissions against him. US authorities have had some short- and medium-term successes likely attributable to KSM’s capture—terror plots halted in early stages, lives saved, and terror suspects removed from the streets. But his incarceration has also led to long-term political, legal, and ethical conundrums. How long can the US detain an individual without trial? Can the US legitimately use brutal methods, including torture, to elicit information from suspects, and then use that information—the fruit of the poison tree—against them in a court of law? Does KSM’s evolving legal status matter? And what does the treatment he receives at the hand of US authorities acting in an official capacity mean for the future of US national security actions against other suspected terrorists—or even US citizens?
The way KSM has been treated in US custody has become a Rorschach test for people discussing finishing techniques. Either he’s a terrorist of the first order, and nothing should be off-limits to extract intelligence or achieve justice (or revenge), or he’s the most famous victim of an overbearing, overreaching counterterrorism program that has shredded the US Constitution and has trampled on American values and decency. The example of KSM—and the treatment he received in US custody—serves as a cautionary tale about the ongoing issues that America’s new national security posture has brought. The fires and the fears of another attack following 9/11 have long since receded, but the US is now left with the consequences of its decisions from that time.
CHAPTER 6
COUNTERTERRORISM IN A WAR ZONE
War is a series of catastrophes that results in a victory.
—GEORGES CLEMENCEAU
“O h shit.” Those were the last words uttered by Sergio Vieira de Mello, the Brazilian United Nations secretary-general special representative to Iraq, before a massive truck bomb ignited in frightful luminescence underneath his personal office. The explosion caused the UN Baghdad compound at the Canal Hotel to pancake and crumble on the afternoon of August 19, 2003. 1 The envoy had just begun a meeting with colleagues and outside researchers when the force of the explosion caused the roof, walls, and floors in his wing of the building to buckle and disintegrate, leaving a large tan and gray concrete jumble where the UN’s mission—and its top man—had stood moments before.
The bombing would eventually claim some two dozen lives—UN officials, independent researchers, and local nationals dedicated to forging a better future for Iraq. After another suicide strike against the Canal Hotel a month later, the UN decided to pull out of Iraq. One organization single-handedly forced the humiliating withdrawal of the UN—an organization that had maintained a steadfast presence in Iraq throughout the punishing years of sanctions during the 1990s.
It was the handiwork of relatively little known terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his group Jama’at a-Tawhid wa Jihad (JTJ). He and his organization would eventually go by a number of names. In October 2004 it evolved into Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad Fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (Organization of Jihad’s Base in the Country of the Two Rivers, or QJBR), better known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Zarqawi would prove to be a master of mayhem, battering away at the US mission in Iraq, and acting as the bogeyman most responsible for spurring the sectarian carnage that engulfed the country after 2003. After Saddam Hussein was captured, Zarqawi became high value target number 1 for the US. And despite intense efforts to track him down, Zarqawi
While a number of his colleagues, such as Mohammad Atef, met fiery ends courtesy of missiles launched from overhead aerial platforms, KSM was captured alive, allowing US authorities to use newly expanded national security tools such as rendition, enhanced interrogation techniques, and military commissions against him. US authorities have had some short- and medium-term successes likely attributable to KSM’s capture—terror plots halted in early stages, lives saved, and terror suspects removed from the streets. But his incarceration has also led to long-term political, legal, and ethical conundrums. How long can the US detain an individual without trial? Can the US legitimately use brutal methods, including torture, to elicit information from suspects, and then use that information—the fruit of the poison tree—against them in a court of law? Does KSM’s evolving legal status matter? And what does the treatment he receives at the hand of US authorities acting in an official capacity mean for the future of US national security actions against other suspected terrorists—or even US citizens?
The way KSM has been treated in US custody has become a Rorschach test for people discussing finishing techniques. Either he’s a terrorist of the first order, and nothing should be off-limits to extract intelligence or achieve justice (or revenge), or he’s the most famous victim of an overbearing, overreaching counterterrorism program that has shredded the US Constitution and has trampled on American values and decency. The example of KSM—and the treatment he received in US custody—serves as a cautionary tale about the ongoing issues that America’s new national security posture has brought. The fires and the fears of another attack following 9/11 have long since receded, but the US is now left with the consequences of its decisions from that time.
CHAPTER 6
COUNTERTERRORISM IN A WAR ZONE
War is a series of catastrophes that results in a victory.
—GEORGES CLEMENCEAU
“O h shit.” Those were the last words uttered by Sergio Vieira de Mello, the Brazilian United Nations secretary-general special representative to Iraq, before a massive truck bomb ignited in frightful luminescence underneath his personal office. The explosion caused the UN Baghdad compound at the Canal Hotel to pancake and crumble on the afternoon of August 19, 2003. 1 The envoy had just begun a meeting with colleagues and outside researchers when the force of the explosion caused the roof, walls, and floors in his wing of the building to buckle and disintegrate, leaving a large tan and gray concrete jumble where the UN’s mission—and its top man—had stood moments before.
The bombing would eventually claim some two dozen lives—UN officials, independent researchers, and local nationals dedicated to forging a better future for Iraq. After another suicide strike against the Canal Hotel a month later, the UN decided to pull out of Iraq. One organization single-handedly forced the humiliating withdrawal of the UN—an organization that had maintained a steadfast presence in Iraq throughout the punishing years of sanctions during the 1990s.
It was the handiwork of relatively little known terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his group Jama’at a-Tawhid wa Jihad (JTJ). He and his organization would eventually go by a number of names. In October 2004 it evolved into Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad Fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (Organization of Jihad’s Base in the Country of the Two Rivers, or QJBR), better known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Zarqawi would prove to be a master of mayhem, battering away at the US mission in Iraq, and acting as the bogeyman most responsible for spurring the sectarian carnage that engulfed the country after 2003. After Saddam Hussein was captured, Zarqawi became high value target number 1 for the US. And despite intense efforts to track him down, Zarqawi
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