had no interest in forming an alliance with Germany, a nation weakened by sanctions after World War I. He considered Hitler’s racial theories of Aryan supremacy ludicrous. But in 1936, the two leaders developed a closer relationship following Italy’s and Germany’s interventions in the Spanish Civil War (1936–39) in support of General Francisco Franco and his Nationalists. By November 1 of that year, impressed by Hitler’s consolidation of power and the remarkable turnaround of German industry, Mussolini delivered a speech in front of Milan’s towering cathedral, the Duomo, in which he hitched the future of Italy to the ambitions of the German leader. He boldly predicted that the rest of Europe would soon revolve around the “axis” of Europe’s two most powerful countries.
In the early years of their alliance, Mussolini believed that he could manage Hitler, but by 1943, any question about who managed whom had been laid to rest. Hitler had militarized Germany, building it into a war machine with state-of-the-art technologies. The nation and its people existed to serve the Führer in whatever manner he determined; no sacrifice would be too great.
Fond of delivering grandiose speeches but less skilled at long-term logistics, Mussolini made no such provisions to prepare the Italian people and its industry for the hardships ahead. Food riots began in southern Italy as early as January 1941; food rationing began nine months later. Government disorganization resulted in misallocation of resources. Labor shortages coexisted with unemployment. Poverty increased in the countryside as the war “tore their sons from the plough.” Time and again, Mussolini’s leadership proved inadequate. But like an apprentice whose allegiance to his mentor endures even after recognizing his elder’s failings, Hitler maintained his affection and admiration for Mussolini.
The German High Command had urged Hitler to demand control of all Italian ground and air forces. Any hope of stopping the Allied advance in Sicily depended on it. The Italian High Command, Comando Supremo , expected Mussolini to explain Italy’s predicament to the Führer using words from a telegram they drafted for him the previous day: “The sacrifice of my country cannot have as its principal purpose that of delaying a direct attack on Germany. . . . My country, which entered the war three years earlier than was foreseen and after it already had engaged in two wars, has step by step exhausted itself, burning up its resources.” Of the two, Mussolini had the more difficult assignment.
At 11 a.m., Mussolini, accompanied by General Vittorio Ambrosio, Chief of Staff for the Italian Army, and two government representatives, entered the main lounge of the villa with Hitler and his four-man entourage. The meeting began with a lengthy monologue by Hitler, without translation, about the progress of the war, the outcome of which would “determine the fate of Europe.” Sometime after 11:30 a.m., Mussolini’s personal secretary burst into the room carrying an urgent message, which the Duce then read aloud in German: “At this moment the enemy is engaged in a violent bombardment of Rome.” Hitler resumed his one-sided narration with barely a pause.
After Mussolini failed to convey the message his generals had drafted, General Ambrosio took advantage of a short break before the private lunch between the two leaders. He insisted to Mussolini that Italy exit the war within fifteen days. Mussolini replied: “It sounds so simple: one day, at a given hour, one sends a radio message to the enemy . . . but with what consequences? . . . What attitude will Hitler take? Perhaps you think that he would give us liberty of action?”
Although Mussolini later pleaded for additional German military support, the shame of admitting that Italy’s resources had been exhausted was simply too great. Under his leadership, Italy had entered the war aligned with Hitler and the Nazis. There