entrenched sense of entitlement produces some such form of moral error in a systematic way. It is in that general way that the asshole treats himself as morally special.
Of course, we often disagree about what entitlements people do or do not have, especially in political life. That means we will often disagree about who is or is not an asshole. For example, according to Lefty, Bill O’Reilly is an asshole. He is opportunistically exploiting working-class resentment. And according to Righty, O’Reilly is no asshole. He is heroically giving voice to working-class resentment. According to our theory, whether O’Reilly counts as an asshole depends on whether
he is in fact entitled
to act as he acts. People can disagree about that, given their background views about his social role and its value or disvalue, without disagreeing about what it is to be an asshole generally. So both Lefty and Righty can accept our theory. Lefty can say that O’Reilly is an asshole but happily admit that this wouldn’t be so if Righty were correct that O’Reilly is entitled to do as he does (and vice versa). The same is true of the many examples discussed in chapters 2 and 3 . Many won’t agree with the moral diagnoses I offer of those figures. Even so, we can all agree about what the essence of the asshole is.
TAKING STOCK
Let us return to the three things we said that any good theory of assholes should explain and take stock of how our theory explains each of them.
The first is relatively straightforward: we are looking for a stable trait of character. Our theory picks out a stable trait of character because the asshole’s sense of entitlement is “entrenched” in his motivational makeup: the feeling of entitlement does not merely occasionally spring up, like a sudden urge to watch a B movie. Nor is the feeling reoccurring but readily struck down. A person of good conscience might be aware of his own inner asshole and yet often successfully remind himself that his life is of no more importance than anyone else’s, that his own talents and accomplishments are largely a matter of luck, and that he is fortunate to live well and savor the sweetness of people in normal cooperative life. The asshole not only lacks such motivational correctives, his sense of entitlement is “entrenched,” in the sense that he is persistently assured, even upon reflection, that he is quite unlike everyone else. When the world questions his special standing in it, it is the challenge rather than the standing that gives way. The asshole sees no need to defend his special place in the social world, or he easily produces convincing rationalizations and moves on. He may even compliment himself on his resiliency and formidable argumentative powers. If reflection is for most people an important source of moral learning, the asshole puts reflection mainly in the service of assuring himself. This leaves him quite impervious to reform. Even when profound hardships befall him, and there is abundant therapeutichelp, he will, in all likelihood, never see reason to change. 16
Let’s turn to the second feature to be explained—that the asshole is not invariably bad in terms of the material costs he imposes upon others. We explain this by defining the “special advantages” the asshole takes in a restricted way. There is nothing wrong
in itself
with enjoying the benefit of cutting to the front of a line, or of speaking out of turn, or of being freed from certain responsibilities. These actions are not, as such, wrong in the way it is wrong, say, to kill someone for the sake of fast cash. In general, the goods the asshole allows himself to enjoy flow from social practices that are generally beneficial. We ourselves admit that the asshole, too, should share in those sorts of goods, in the right measure and at the right times. The general problem is that the asshole helps himself to more than his share, or acts out of turn, or sloughs off the burdens that must generally