Irvine had half expected.
âSome things came up during Stuxnet that didnât specifically contribute to that project,â continued Irvine. âThey did, though, give me an idea that I ran past Conrad Graham, then the CIAâs director of covert operations. He approved my exploring them as a possible operation, which for a time I did as a research project.â Irvine stopped, again risking an interruption he didnât want and fortunately didnât come. âItâs important for all of you to understand that everything youâve so far done at my request was properly approved and authorized.â
Irvine was conscious of renewed looks between Marian and Singleton. The two Pakistani Americans still gave no reaction.
âItâs a CIA-financed operation, headed by a covert-division supervisor named Jim Bradley. Harry Packerâs the liaison officer from here,â went on Irvine. âEveryone in this room has the highest security clearance, higher probably than a lot of the CIA people working on the periphery of whatâs involved. Weâre not on the periphery. Weâre at the very core, the people making it work, and I donât want it continuing as it has until now.â
âI donât think I do, either,â intruded Singleton at last. âIâd like what at the moment sounds like nonsense properly explained, right now!â
âWeâd all like that,â insisted Marian. âOur employment contracts are with the National Security Agency, not the Central Intelligence Agency, by whose operating procedures none of us is bound.â
Irvine had forgotten Marian held a corporate law degree. âThatâs why weâre having this meeting.â
*Â Â Â *Â Â Â *
âTo make the Stuxnet sabotage work we had to get to the Programmable Logic Controller of Iranâs Natanz and Bushehr facility computers,â reminded Irvine. âWhich we couldnât, not by direct hacking. The Iranians had anticipated the danger of an Internet connection. Their nuclear PLCs werenât connected but ran independently. Our only way in was to hack the personal computers of the Natanz and Bushehr scientists to create our botnetsâor Trojan horses or spiders, whatever you want to call themâthe moment they put their memory sticks into their otherwise protectively isolated mainframesâ¦â
Marian and Singleton were nodding in recollection. Barker and Malik were both pressed forward, easily following the explanation.
âIsraelâs Mossad had a lot of personnel file details on the Iranian and Russian technicians at Natanz and Bushehr,â picked up Irvine, his earlier tension easing. âIsrael also have equipment similar to our own algorithm capacity and our dual random-number generators.â Irvine cleared his throat, wishing heâd brought water into the room with him. Looking to Singleton, he said, âAm I making myself clear?â
âIâll let you know if you donât,â said the man with obvious reservation.
Was it just an irritation at not being included from the beginning? wondered Irvine. Or was it deeper than that, the resentment of someone twenty years his senior believing he should have been the project leader? âOnce we got into the personal PCs, we automatically gained access to every nameâand computerâon each PCâs contacts list, multiplying our botnet trawl. They were careless, these guys; had every excuse to be, I guess. They were inside what was supposed to be the most secure facility in the entire country. No-one could get to them, read their mail, which was why they wrote in clear, never encryption. I read a hell of a lot, we used a hell of a lot. There was one guy I picked out early on, signed himself Hamid. Came to believe that at another time in another Cold War heâd have been described as a commissar. Hamid didnât close down after Stuxnet so I went on