any nukes based on their territory, or if they did, the warheads and arming codes were under firm Russian control. Other states, like Kazakhstan, inherited part of the arsenal but pledged to renounce nuclear weapons. But there were still others, like Ukraine, that felt they needed to keep the nukes based on their territory to maintain their newfound independence, just in case the Russian bear gets hungry again.â
âHell,â MacKenzie said, âeven if one of the new governments promises to disassemble all of the weapons it controlled, how could such a promise possibly be monitored?â
âEven more dangerous, though,â Murdock continued, âyou have an awful lot of very desperate people running around in a state that has collapsed to near anarchy in some areas. Much of the modern Russian economyâand that means a lot of the governmentâis controlled by the Russian mafia. Itâs an open secret that half a million hard-currency dollars will buy you a small nuke on the weapons black market. And there are generals and scientists and technicians, all of them with access to nukes and all of them knowing that pretty soon theyâre not going to have a job. The temptation to sell a few weapons here and there, maybe to some guy from Iran or Libya, must be overwhelming in cases like that.
âAnyway, one of the major nightmares of the people back in the Pentagon whose job it is to think about such things is the one about how easy it will be to slip a small nuclear device into a major U.S. port aboard a freighter, an oil tanker, even a pleasure boat. It wouldnât even have to be an atomic bomb. A few pounds of plutonium, stolen from a breeder reactor facility somewhere, or purchased from North Korea and scattered on the winds or the waves by a charge of conventional high explosives, could poison hundreds, even thousand of square miles. If that happened inside a major city . . .â
âPlutonium is more than a component of an atomic bomb,â Inge said. âIt is the single most toxic substance known to man.â
âAffirmative,â Murdock said. âAnd if you do have the wherewithal to build a bomb, you donât need a hell of a lot of the stuff. Modern nukes arenât quite small enough to fit inside a suitcase . . . but theyâre terrifyingly close.â
âI have heard,â Hopke said, âthat a bright chemistry student might be able to extract the necessary radioactives to construct a small A-bomb.â
âTheoretically,â Murdock said, nodding. âStill, the preferred method of nuclear-club wannabe states like Libya and of terrorists worldwide is to steal the stuff . . . or to buy it from people who arenât choosy about who they sell it to. Like some rogue ex-Soviet army officer whoâs hard up for cold cash. Or fun states like North Korea.â
âIs that what this Maverick Lance report is about?â Hopke asked. âSomeone is trying to smuggle plutonium?â
âOh, we know theyâre smuggling plutonium, Lieutenant,â Murdock said. A Maverick Lance alert was part of the ongoing attempt by U.S. military and other government authorities to keep track of the world black market in stolen nuclear material and, where possible, to stop it. âIn fact, itâs damned scary just how many groups are involved in the traffic right now. Weâre here to try to find out just what it is theyâre planning to do with it. The Maverick Lance alert was called because the CIA has identified several North Korean agents operating in Europe, and we think theyâre part of the plutonium pipeline.â
Inge frowned. âSo you in America are of the opinion that the North Koreans and the Red Army Faction are all working together somehow? To what end?â
âThat,â Murdock said, âis what we would very much like to know.â
âPerhaps you should tell us, Lieutenant,â Hopke said quietly,