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office, under the authority of the United States.” Thus, Marshall concluded, the statute gave the Court jurisdiction to issue the writ that Marbury sought (mandamus) to the person responsible for giving the commission (Madison), as long as the issuance was “warranted by the principles and usages of law.” And the issuance arguably was warranted because courts have traditionallyissued writs of mandamus to compel government officers to carry out legally required ministerial duties such as delivering a document like the commission. 12
    But the Court was still not finished. It went on to ask whether the Constitution allowed Congress to enact a statute like this, which grants the power to issue a writ of mandamus in Marbury’s favor. The Court’s answer made the case famous.
    Recall that Marbury did not originally file his case in a lower court and then appeal the case to the Supreme Court. Rather, he originally filed the case in the Supreme Court itself. Now, here is Marshall’s tour de force: whatever that “perfect” statute might say, the Constitution itself says that
    in all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party,
the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction
. In
all
the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have
appellate
Jurisdiction.
     
     
    But this case did not affect ambassadors, public ministers (that is, representatives of foreign governments), or consuls. It was not a case in which a state was a party. Nor did it invoke the Court’s
appellate
jurisdiction. Hence, if the statute gave the Court the power to hear Marbury’s case as an
original
matter, the statute conflicted with the Constitution. Thus, the Court had to decide “
whether an act repugnant to the constitution can become the law of the land.
” 13
    Chief Justice Marshall said this question was “deeply interesting to the United States; but, happily, not of an intricacy proportioned to its interest.” For one thing, the American Constitution, unlike the English constitution, was a
written
constitution. And an “act of the legislature repugnant” to that written Constitution must be “void.” Otherwise, the Constitution’s provisions would not be “fundamental,” “supreme,” and “permanent.” Otherwise, the Constitution would create a federal government of unlimited, not limited, power. By enforcing a law that is “entirely void,” the Court would grant the legislature legal and practical “omnipotence.” 14
    The opinion next pointed out that resolving conflicts among different laws by determining, for example, which law prevailed was “the very essence of judicial duty.” Here is the heart of the matter: an invalid law could not bind the courts because it “is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” 15 The Constitution is law and is our country’s supreme law, so the Court must follow the Constitution and override a conflicting statute if a case presents that conflict.
    Finally, various provisions of the Constitution itself seemed to foresee that courts would have the power to authoritatively interpret and enforce the Constitution. Article III says that the “judicial Power” of the United States includes the power to decide cases “arising under” the “Constitution.” It also says that the government may not convict a person of treason on the testimony of only one witness. Article I says that states may not impose an export tax. And Article VI says that the Constitution “shall be the supreme Law of the Land” and provides that “all … judicial Officers … shall be bound by Oath … to support this Constitution.” (Congress had added that judges must promise to “discharge” all their duties “agreeably to the Constitution.”) Surely this meant that if a state (violating what the Constitution said) tried to prosecute someone who had failed to pay an export tax,