Madison's Music Read Online Free
Author: Burt Neuborne
grantâconstitutionally off limits. Actually, using subsidies instead of spending limits would become much easier, because under a democracy-friendly First Amendment it would be impossible to characterize a matching campaign subsidy system aimed at leveling the electoral playing field as a âpenaltyâ on wealthy candidates.
Reasonable campaign spending limits would also prevent electoral corruption in at least two important ways. It would prevent âindependentâ supporters from pouring so much money into a campaign that the winner canât help feeling a sense of obligation (and a hope of future support) that causes her to tilt in the direction suggested by the huge supporter. We already recognize such a possibility in the contribution process. Thatâs why the size of a contribution is limited. We already recognize such a possibility in the context of judicial elections. Thatâs why judges canât sit on cases involving folks who spent a fortune to get them elected. The same reasoning calls for reasonable limits on all campaign spending by wealthy independent donors.
Equally important, a generous campaign spending cap would end the current campaign spending spiral that drives each candidate into a never-ending effort to raise funds out of fear that he will be outspent by an opponent. As we learned during the Cold War nuclear standoff with the Soviet Union, such a spiral forces both parties into frenzied action designed to avoid yielding an advantage to the other, even when neither wishes to act. A generous spending cap would permit both sides to relax and to focus on substance once the cap was reached. It would also eliminate the potentially corrupt bargaining power exerted by a supporter as a campaign draws to aclose and the candidate gets really desperate. In fact, a generous spending cap would make all contributions fungible, allowing a candidate to spurn support from a donor seeking undue influence because the cap could be achieved using alternative sources.
Demoting campaign spending from pure speech to communicative conduct would not deprive it of all First Amendment protections. No regulation could be âviewpoint drivenâ in an effort to weaken disfavored speech. Spending limits could not be unreasonably low. But reasonable efforts to cap campaign spending at a generous level (far higher than the unreasonably low ceilings imposed in the 1974 act that were struck down in Buckley ) would ensure vigorously contested political campaigns without surrendering our democracy to the tender mercies of the superrich.
REDISCOVERING THE IDEA OF CONTESTED LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS
Madisonâs democracy-friendly First Amendment would also provide a desperately needed antidote to the epidemic of political gerrymandering that has sucked the air out of our state and federal legislative elections. Widespread gerrymandering at every level of American government has made it almost impossible to topple a legislative incumbent powerful and wily enough to tailor-make a district that canât be lost. Constant gerrymandering of legislative districts virtually guarantees the reelection of incumbents and gives the party in power a disproportionate share of the legislative seats. In the 2012 elections for the House of Representatives, for example, Republicans won a comfortable 234â201 majority, despite being outpolled nationally by more than one million votes in House races. While a slice of the extra one million votes was in urban districts overwhelmingly won by Democrats, as many as 15 seats of the Republican 33-seat margin are traceable to the adroit drawing of congressional district lines to maximize Republican voting power. And 2012 wasnât an aberration. Using the criteria of the American Political Science Association, partisan gerrymanderingby both parties has resulted in a House of Representatives where only about 40 seatsâfewer than 10 percent of the membershipâare chosen
Reasonable campaign spending limits would also prevent electoral corruption in at least two important ways. It would prevent âindependentâ supporters from pouring so much money into a campaign that the winner canât help feeling a sense of obligation (and a hope of future support) that causes her to tilt in the direction suggested by the huge supporter. We already recognize such a possibility in the contribution process. Thatâs why the size of a contribution is limited. We already recognize such a possibility in the context of judicial elections. Thatâs why judges canât sit on cases involving folks who spent a fortune to get them elected. The same reasoning calls for reasonable limits on all campaign spending by wealthy independent donors.
Equally important, a generous campaign spending cap would end the current campaign spending spiral that drives each candidate into a never-ending effort to raise funds out of fear that he will be outspent by an opponent. As we learned during the Cold War nuclear standoff with the Soviet Union, such a spiral forces both parties into frenzied action designed to avoid yielding an advantage to the other, even when neither wishes to act. A generous spending cap would permit both sides to relax and to focus on substance once the cap was reached. It would also eliminate the potentially corrupt bargaining power exerted by a supporter as a campaign draws to aclose and the candidate gets really desperate. In fact, a generous spending cap would make all contributions fungible, allowing a candidate to spurn support from a donor seeking undue influence because the cap could be achieved using alternative sources.
Demoting campaign spending from pure speech to communicative conduct would not deprive it of all First Amendment protections. No regulation could be âviewpoint drivenâ in an effort to weaken disfavored speech. Spending limits could not be unreasonably low. But reasonable efforts to cap campaign spending at a generous level (far higher than the unreasonably low ceilings imposed in the 1974 act that were struck down in Buckley ) would ensure vigorously contested political campaigns without surrendering our democracy to the tender mercies of the superrich.
REDISCOVERING THE IDEA OF CONTESTED LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS
Madisonâs democracy-friendly First Amendment would also provide a desperately needed antidote to the epidemic of political gerrymandering that has sucked the air out of our state and federal legislative elections. Widespread gerrymandering at every level of American government has made it almost impossible to topple a legislative incumbent powerful and wily enough to tailor-make a district that canât be lost. Constant gerrymandering of legislative districts virtually guarantees the reelection of incumbents and gives the party in power a disproportionate share of the legislative seats. In the 2012 elections for the House of Representatives, for example, Republicans won a comfortable 234â201 majority, despite being outpolled nationally by more than one million votes in House races. While a slice of the extra one million votes was in urban districts overwhelmingly won by Democrats, as many as 15 seats of the Republican 33-seat margin are traceable to the adroit drawing of congressional district lines to maximize Republican voting power. And 2012 wasnât an aberration. Using the criteria of the American Political Science Association, partisan gerrymanderingby both parties has resulted in a House of Representatives where only about 40 seatsâfewer than 10 percent of the membershipâare chosen
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