except for Manila itself. As this point Aguinaldo believed that the
United States would recognize his government. He was wrong.
On August 14, 1898, the Spanish formally surrendered to the Americans. The previous day’s combat for control of Manila had
been something of a sham. Guidelines over the conduct of the battle had been prearranged between the Americans and the Spanish.
The subsequent show of Spanish re sistance was a matter of honor, although the American casualties, 17 killed and 105 wounded,
were real enough. The so-called First Battle of Manila was unusual in several respects. The nominal foes, Spain and the United
States, shared a strong common interest in barring Aguinaldo’s rebels from the city. The nominal allies ended the battle almost
in armed conflict with each other. Hasty negotiations allowed the rebels to remain in the suburbs while the Americans controlled
the city. Perhaps the least surprising outcome from the battle was the immediate collapse of army-navy harmony. Dewey told
American war correspondents that he had had everything arranged for a bloodless transfer of power and that the army had taken
unnecessary losses for glory’s sake alone. The general who commanded the assault columns responded by publishing an account
of the army’s storming Manila without any naval assistance.
Safely ensconced behind the walls of old Manila, the Americans issued a proclamation to inform the Filipino people that the
United States had not come to wage war on them. At year’s end President William McKinley reinforced this point by declaring
that U.S. policy was to be based on benign assimilation, a paternal policy in which the knowing elder improved the child by
providing education and discipline. Of course, to accomplish benign assimilation it was necessary to occupy the islands. Without
realizing the difficulty of the task, McKinley charged the U.S. Army with enforcing “lawful rule” throughout the islands.
At the same time, he ordered it to protect Filipino lives, property, and civil rights. McKinley thereby set the army a twofold
task: one military and one involving civil affairs. The president was convinced that in time the Filipinos would see that
American motives for occupying the islands were pure and that this realization would end any re sistance. Like Aguinaldo,
McKinley was wrong in his conviction.
Following the Spanish surrender, a state of high tension persisted for almost half a year. About 14,000 American soldiers
established a perimeter defending Manila and worked fitfully to make the city a showcase for the benefits of benign assimilation.
Meanwhile, Aguinaldo’s newly named Army of Liberation, with about 30,000 soldiers, maintained a loose cordon around the city
while Aguinaldo, who felt betrayed by American conduct, prepared for war. He and his insurrectos , as the Americans labeled them, did not intend to exchange one colonial master for another. Aguinaldo warned that his government
was ready to fight if the Americans tried to take forcible possession of insurgent-controlled territory. Operating under McKinley’s
assumption that it was only a matter of time until Filipinos came to their senses, the American commander of ground forces,
General Elwell Otis, avoided provoking the insurgents. Finally the inevitable occurred on the evening of February 4, 1899,
when a shooting incident escalated into war.
The next day President Aguinaldo issued a proclamation to the Philippine people announcing the outbreak of hostilities. It
explained that he had tried to avoid conflict, but “all my efforts have been useless against the measureless pride of the
American Government . . . who have treated me as a rebel because I defend the sacred interests of my country.” 3
On the Brink of Victory
The Philippine-American War had two distinct phases. During the first, conventional phase, from February to November 1899,
Aguinaldo’s soldiers