July 1914: Countdown to War Read Online Free Page A

fight Russia. Had Austria begun her mobilization against Serbia in the first week, instead of the last week, of July, and implemented Plan B without interruption, there is no telling how the crisis would have played out. It might still have led to European war, or it might have led to some kind of face-saving compromise along the lines of a “Halt in Belgrade.” It was largely Tisza’s doing that Austria did not present her ultimatum until four weeks after Sarajevo. Of course, his motivation in blocking Conrad was honorable: he wanted, at least until 14 July, to prevent war, not to cause it. If there is any sin in Tisza’s behavior, it is a negative one of omission leading to unintended consequences.
    The German sin, at the time of the Hoyos mission of 5–6 July, was more serious. By giving Austria-Hungary a blank check against Serbia, Kaiser Wilhelm II and Bethmann Hollweg made a broader escalation of the Balkan crisis possible. Given Tisza’s opposition, there is reason to believe that Conrad would not have gotten his Serbian war at all without German intervention. It was not German support alone that changed Tisza’s mind—his own revulsion against Serbia grew organically the first two weeks in July, as he learned more about Sarajevo—but without it Berchtold would have had a very hard time convincing the emperor to move forward, whatever Tisza’s views. Austria’s diplomatic isolation and military weakness meant that German backing was indispensable. The Germans gave it unambiguously. Still, although it is true that Arthur Zimmermann, the undersecretary of state, and many military chiefs in Berlin, were keen on the idea of “preventive war,” it is equally clear that Kaiser Wilhelm II and Bethmann did not expect Russia to fight. While they recognized the risks and were willing to runthem, they did not intend to provoke European war. Their real sin, at this stage of the crisis, lay in failing to mandate any particular Austrian course of action, or to establish firmer guidelines as to how Vienna would coordinate its strategy with Berlin. The blank check was foolish and self-defeating. It encouraged Berchtold to behave as recklessly as possible, under the mistaken impression that this was what the Germans wanted him to do.
    Berchtold himself must shoulder the greatest blame for bringing the crisis to the danger point on 23 July. Having lost the chance for a military fait accompli, Austria’s foreign minister settled for a diplomatic one, detonating his ultimatum bombshell without even clearing the text first with his German allies. True, this was partly Bethmann’s fault for leaving Berchtold alone to do his worst and for failing to press Vienna for more information until it was too late. And yet Jagow did request to see the text; he also asked that Berchtold do his “homework” and finalize a dossier of Serbian guilt before dispatching the ultimatum, and make sure of Italy’s support. Berchtold did nothing of the kind. After sending the ultimatum under seal to Belgrade, he even lied to Germany’s ambassador that it was not yet finished. Here was conscious intention to deceive not only a hostile power such as Russia, but even Austria’s closest ally. Of all the what-ifs of the July crisis, this is one of the greatest. If Berchtold had done what the Germans asked and convinced Europe of Serbia’s perfidy, he would have put the diplomatic onus back on Russia to advocate for her guilty client. With what we know today of Serbian complicity in the Sarajevo crime, it is astonishing that Austrian officials were unable to marshal a convincing case even a month after the crime in Sarajevo.
    Still, serious as Berchtold’s errors were, it was not he who began the countdown to European war. His blundering helped isolate Austria-Hungary and embarrass Germany for supportingher, but his actions did not force Russia to mobilize, much less France or Germany. Here the timeline becomes all-important. Because of