philosophy of Natural Rights typically do so because they are frustrated by what they perceive to be an inherent subjectivity in the method of identifying those rights. After all, the law prides itself on being objective and determinable. And sadly, the ambiguity of the Natural Law has been abused from time to time so as to disparage our natural rights.
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Such was the case in Justice Joseph P. Bradleyâs concurrence in Bradwell v. Illinois , an 1873 Supreme Court case that upheld Illinoisâ refusal to license a woman as a lawyer. He famously stated that âthe constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood.â Just as geography was once plagued by the belief that the world is flat, so, too, has the practice of discerning the Natural Law fallen victim to ignorance, stereotyping, and invidious discrimination by the government.
The problem with this criticism is that it entirely misconceives the character of natural rights. Rather than be turned off by any sort of perceived subjectivity of determining our âproper ends,â we should be instilled with a sense of deep respect for and complete deference to those immutable yearnings implicit in the order of things. It is no more sensible to reject the natural law for its lack of objectivity than to disparage the field of physics for the cryptic behavior of subatomic particles, and thus revert to the belief that all things are made up of earth, wind, water, and fire because it is easier to understand. Subjectivity has absolutely nothing to do with truth, merely the ease and certainty of determining what those truths are.
Our politicians should be terrified at the prospect of encroaching upon our natural rights, and thus interfering with the natural order of things, especially because of their subjectivity, just as we would be terrified to take some experimental medicine about which nothing was known. And as we shall see, even someone who does not believe in the philosophy of the natural law must accept that, if properly followed, it avoids all of the crimes against humanity which we have seen government commit throughout human history. I speak not just of the truth of Natural Rights, but their capacity to foil tyranny.
However, the concept of rights does not in reality have to be complicated at all. Rather, all rights, and indeed all tenets of libertarian philosophy, can be traced back to one single right: The right to own property. Although we traditionally think of this as the right to control tangible, external things (and that is the understanding adopted by the chapter in this book on property rights), it really begins earlier, with a property right to oneâs own body. If we acknowledge this application of the right in conjunction with the nonaggression principle, then we also recognize free speech, freedom of association, freedom of travel, and a right to privacy. As Murray Rothbard explains in his book The Ethics of Liberty ,
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A person does not have a âright to freedom of speechâ; what he does have is the right to hire a hall and address the people who enter the premises. He does not have a âright to freedom of the pressâ; what he does have is the right to write or publish a pamphlet, and to sell that pamphlet to those who are willing to buy it (or to give it away to those who are willing to accept it). Thus, what he has in each of these cases is property rights, including the right of free contract and transfer which form a part of such rights of ownership. There is no extra âright of free speechâ or free press beyond the property rights that a person may have in any given case. 4
If we, however, extend this property right beyond the body and acknowledge that humans must retain control over tangible things external to them, then we also