to an end after the ‘Final Solution’ had been determined upon in
principle but that after 1942 decisions were continually being reached that affected
the lives of millions of people—in this case it is clear that the implementation of
Judenpolitik was not only the result of priorities set by the leadership but was
increasingly influenced by the behaviour of German allies, by the way that the
local administration in occupied territories acted, and not least by the attitude of
the local populations and the behaviour of Germany’s enemies.
There is a further key factor to be considered, too. The Jewish population that in
1941 faced the plans being made for the ‘Final Solution’ was defenceless and wholly
unprepared, but in the second half of the war it too became an element that
influenced the way the perpetrators proceeded. By fleeing, by seeking to escape
persecution by living in a hide-away or underground, but also by negotiating with
individuals or bribing them, they were attempting to slow down the inexorable
process of annihilation and thereby—if only to a limited extent—influencing the
behaviour of the perpetrators.
Here research into the perpetrators reaches its limits, or in other words the
further into the war is the stage that research concentrates on, the more difficult it
becomes to reconstruct the development of the persecution and annihilation of
the European Jews by concentrating exclusively on persecutors and their activities.
This is not to say that concentrating on the persecutors in the period after 1942 is
historiographically impossible or pointless, but that it is important to make
precisely clear what the parameters are within which the perpetrators were able
to act autonomously.
Fourthly, if the history of the final solution is seen as a chain of ongoing
decisions that together come to make up the full context of Judenpolitik, then
the fate of the other groups persecuted by the Nazis must also be considered, or
8
Introduction
considered at least in so far as they reveal direct comparisons with or information
about the National Socialists’ Judenpolitik.
These, then, are the fundamental ideas around which this book’s depiction of
Judenpolitik in the years between 1933 and 1945 will be oriented. There is one
further significant angle that needs to be considered in more detail, and it
concerns the tricky nature of the available sources.
As far as possible this study is based on primary sources. Alongside the
documentary holdings of the German administrative departments that are housed
in well-known archives in Germany and outside, this study will also consider the
holdings of archives in the former Warsaw Pact states that since the 1990s have
become accessible to scholars. In practical terms this primarily means Moscow’s
‘Special Archive’ where two collections have been used in some detail: the papers
of the Central Association of German Citizens of the Jewish Faith—the Central-
verein Deutscher Staatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens (hereafter referred to simply as
the Centralverein)—which permits a far more detailed picture of the Nazis’
persecution of the Jews in the period from 1933 to 1938 than has hitherto been
available; and the papers of the Security Service of the SS (the Sicherheitsdienst, or
SD), which cover the period from 1935 to 1940. In addition, papers from various
other former Soviet, Polish, and Czech archives are considered, some of which
were consulted from copies in Yad Vashem or the US Holocaust Museum in
Washington.
For my investigation of the radicalization of Jewish persecution in the occupied
Soviet zones in the second half of 1941 I have made extensive use of papers from
the Central Office for the Investigation of Nazi Crimes in Ludwigsburg (properly
known as the Zentrale Stelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen zur Aufklärung nation-
alsozialistischer Verbrechen) via the branch office there of the