World Trade Center in 2001, could be at least partly blamed on this lack of coordination.
And at a time when advances in technology were making all sorts of things possible, coordination was essential.
Desk Three’s evolution could be traced directly to the CIA’s former Division D, which had worked with the NSA in the 1950s
and early ’60s planting sensors, stealing code-books, “turning” crypto experts—and assassinating foreigners, though this was
not necessarily an NSA function. It was succeeded by the Special Collection Service, or SCS, which had essentially the same
job, sans assassinations, which were outlawed by Congress following scandals in the 1970s. In both cases, the arrangement
had the CIA working essentially as a contractor to the NSA; the SCS headquarters was not in Crypto City, and the field agents
were never, or almost never, under direct NSA control.
Desk Three was different in that respect. It was intended to represent a new, cutting-edge force to be used for not only collecting
data but also, when the situation demanded, taking action “ad hoc” to meet objectives outlined by the president. It could
tap into the full array of sensors maintained by the NSA, as well as the processed intercepts from those sensors and data
analysis provided by all of the major intelligence agencies. It could call on its own air and space assets, including twelve
Space Platforms, or ultralarge satellites that could launch customized eavesdropping probes, and eight remote-controlled F-47C
robot planes that were arguably as capable as F-22s, with twice their range and about one-third of their size. Underwater
assets gave Desk Three similar capabilities in the ocean. And a small team of agents, drawn from a variety of sources, gave
it muscle.
Several agencies could have “run” Desk Three. Besides the CIA, the military’s USSOCOM, or U.S. Special Operations Command,
had been a lead contender. But the NSA was chosen primarily because it was used to working with the high-tech gear that formed
the backbone of the force concept. It also lacked some of the political entanglements that plagued the others.
And, of course, it contained William Rubens.
Rubens was critical for several reasons beyond his outsize abilities. One was his friendship with Hadash. Another was his
demonstrated skill at melding the disparate talents required for such an enterprise. Last but not least, he had conceived
the concept. He personally wrote the report outlining it, well before Marcke’s election. Titled “Deep Black,” the report formed
the blueprint for the operation and was still among the most highly classified documents in the government archives. The report
title had become an unofficial name for Desk Three and its operations.
Rubens had long ago learned the difficult and distasteful lesson that sheer intelligence, culture, and genetics often mattered
little in Washington, let alone in international affairs. The trick was to use these assets to maintain one’s position and
thereby accomplish one’s goals. It took eternal vigilance and, perhaps, a touch of paranoia.
Rubens cleared his mind of external distractions, preparing himself to speak to the president. The room’s spartan furnishings
made it look as if it belonged in a suburban tract house. A large video display sat behind a set of drapes where the picture
window would be; otherwise the Blue Room was refreshingly devoid of high-tech gadgetry.
The door opened so abruptly Rubens barely had time to get to his feet as the president burst into the room, his hand thrust
forward.
“Billy, how are you?” said Marcke, playing the hail-fellow- well-met politico. Marcke was an inch taller than Rubens, who
at six-four was not short; though in his early sixties, Marcke had an incredibly strong handshake and was said by the media
to work with serious weights every afternoon.
“Fine, sir.”
The president released him and sat