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squadrons were themselves pretty busy on routine work. Only targets that were certain to be identifiable at low level, which were not in the thick of the heaviest flak and whose existence and location were absolutely certain, were attacked. This policy resulted in a very high percentage of successful operations, with great damage to enemy armour and with low casualty rates.
    As the battle moved forward, the IIDs were sent out unescorted [due] to the reduction in enemy air resistance and the difficulty of getting escort from different airfields when the whole air force was moving forward daily. By the time the Tunisian show was over, casualties had reached a worrying level and the IID was clearly past its prime.

    In that short period the Hurricane IID was extremely effective – particularly when its pilots were given timely information, accurate directions and had top cover – at unblocking localised enemy armoured obstructions encountered by the Eighth Army.
    During June 1942 this initial contingent of pilots, ground crew and aircraft, effectively comprising ‘A’ Flight No 6 Squadron, gradually retreated eastwards to LG 102 Sidi Haneish, located adjacent to the main Libyan coastal highway, 20 miles east of Mersa Matruh and 240 miles west of Cairo. The squadron’s base organisation was sent to No 239 Wing HQ sharing LG 91 Amriya (or Amiriya), an airfield on the Alexandria–Cairo road, 15 miles west of Alexandria. On 24 June, Desert Air Force HQ ordered ‘B’ Flight to take its batch of new pilots and aircraft from Shandur forward to join ‘A’ Flight at Sidi Haneish. Once again, though, in the fluid situation and with Sidi Haneish now under regular air attack, this signal was countermanded on the 25th and ‘B’ Flight moved to LG 91 Amriya instead. This was now the base for No 7 (South African) Wing which was composed of Nos 6 (Hurri IID), 127 (IIB) and 274 (IIB) RAF Squadrons and No 7 SAAF (Hurri IIB) Squadron.
    Next day, while ‘B’ Flight moved west to join ‘A’ Flight at Amriya, Howard had his first thirty-five-minute Hurricane sortie in ‘a rather ropey Mark I’ with the training flight back at Shandur. All the ‘new boys’ received lectures in tank recognition. Meanwhile, ‘A’ Flight was in action searching for a squadron of enemy tanks reported to the west of Mersa Matruh. None were found but a convoy of lorries, armoured cars, guns and troop carriers was attacked with some success by Wg Cdr Porteous and four other pilots. In the evening of the 26th, No 211 Group HQ ordered all aircraft to pull back immediately to landing ground LG 106 at El Daba near Ghazal, 50 miles east of Sidi Haneish. The ground personnel were to follow at first light the next morning. With a stop at Fuka landing strip (LG 17) en route – the ground party scrounging rations, equipment and tents as they went – the air and ground echelons were safely installed at Ghazal by evening on the 27th, just in time to be bombed again, fortunately without damage to life or equipment.
    Despite hopping from one airstrip to another at extremely short notice, during June 1942 No 6 Squadron claimed twenty-six tanks, thirty-one armoured troop carriers and large numbers of other vehicles destroyed. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel was pushing hard in his drive eastwards and that thorn in his side, Tobruk – now without fighter and ground attack cover because those units had had to pull so far back – fell to Axis forces on 21 June. There were periods of several days or even a week when No 6 Squadron did not mount anti-tank operations. This is perhaps not so surprising in view of the need for care in mounting their type of sorties, which required the co-operation of one or more other squadrons as escort, and the extreme fluidity of the ground war at this time. The Hurricane fighter squadrons and Hurri-bombers were still in the thick of it and wrested air supremacy – or at least air superiority – from the Luftwaffe. However, the Afrika Korps