SS Brotherhood of the Bell: The Nazis’ Incredible Secret Technology Read Online Free Page B

Russians themselves. In the Spanish language edition of the Soviet Russian science magazine Sputnik there is a report of the destruction in 1945 – during the war – of a Russian munitions factory in the Ural Mountains near the river Tobol. Notably, the article ascribed the destruction to a “terror attack” of “fascist perfidy” much like “the later attacks of American B-52 bombers against the port city of Haiphong in Vietnam.” 19 If the Russian report is accurate and not merely a typical Communist exercise in disinformation or blame-shifting for their own bureaucratic incompetence, then this most probably was a rocket attack, since by that late date in the war the Luftwaffe had little left by way of long range heavy bombers able to make the trip, 20 a trip that in any case had little prospect of success given the Red Air Force’s mastery of the skies over eastern Europe. Only a rocket attack could guarantee success for such an operation.
    Given all the foregoing, it is reasonable to conclude that the Nazis may actually have been successful in testing the first strategic ballistic missiles toward the end of the war, while falling just short of getting them into production.
    ….or is that too, yet another dangerous myth?
    We shall answer that question in a subsequent chapter.
    For now, we address another question. If the Nazis had indeed tested such long-range rockets, much less successfully fired one on Soviet Russia, then this implies that yet another phase of the Amerikaraket went beyond merely being a “paper study.” The Nazis could have tested all the long range rockets they wished, but they would have been utterly useless without a means to guide them to target.
    Thus, the existence of a credible long range and secure guidance system is also corroborative evidence that the Amerikaraket was not just a paper project. The question is, did the Nazis have such means of guidance? The answer is yes, and they did not just exist on paper.
    F. Over-the-Horizon Radars and the Amerikaraket

    Successful German tests of long range rockets, much less an actual German rocket attack on Russian sites in the Urals, implies the existence of associated technologies and methods to guide such missiles accurately to their targets. Indeed, from the scientific and engineering point of view in the early 1940s, accurate guidance of such rockets was the principal problem that the Germans faced, not the actual rocket itself. A number of methods were therefore proposed to make the Amerikaraket accurate, some technological, others less so.
    Given that the Amerikaraket was intended to carry “small atom bombs” 21 and “other weapons of mass destruction,” 22 and since the inertial guidance system of the V-2 would have been inadequate and inaccurate for attacking targets on the American east coast, the Nazis had to consider a variety of alternative modes for guidance. In other words, if the Amerikaraket was not a paper project, then one should expect the Germans to be working in each of the following areas:
    (1) technological and secure means of guiding a rocket to targets at long range; or, failing that,
    (2) alternative methods of guiding a rocket accurately to a target at long range; and,
    (3) technologies of miniaturizing enough rocket and/or A-bomb (or H-bomb or fuel-air bomb) 23 components to enable a long range rocket to be able to carry such heavy payloads.
    Viewed in this way, the Amerikaraket was anything but a paper project, since the Nazis considered any number of methods, from “back-pack” piloted rockets, to enable a pilot to guide the rocket to target visually before bailing out at the last minute, to actually planting a radio transponder inside the Empire State Building for a rocket to home in on, 24 to much more sophisticated and ultimately much more secure technological means of guidance based on beam riding and radar interference. It is this last category that is of most interest to our purposes in this book,