Operation Mercury Read Online Free Page B
Author: John Sadler
than directly to the commander-in-chief.
The Italians had some 280,000 men, supported by 1,500 aircraft; Wavellâs RAF support, headed by Sir Arthur Longmore, could barely muster 200 airworthy machines, many of these obsolete. Supply was by convoy taking the long route around the Cape of Good Hope and through the Red Sea, prone to attack by swift Italian destroyers and submarines. An overland air supply route over the trackless wastes of the Sahara was opened from Takoradi, each run an epic in itself.
In his directive of 16 August 1940 the Prime Minister stressed the vital importance of defending Egypt. Wavell certainly would not demur but he identified the overriding need, not for men but matériel, aircraft, trucks and tanks. Quite correctly he had judged that the war in the desert would be one that was decided by firepower and mobility, supported by superiority in the air. The Generalâs conclusions were accepted and the supply of equipment stepped up accordingly. Churchillâs bold idea of sending a convoy through the Axis-infested waters of the western Mediterranean, whilst extremely risky, paid off.
In Greece a great surge of patriotic fervour, sufficient to unite the many disparate factions, even under the leadership of a despised autocrat such as Metaxas, rallied and took on the Italian invaders. Despite a shortage of just about everything and a haphazard supply chain, the ill-armed Greek conscripts swiftly brought Mussoliniâs seemingly irresistible juggernaut to an abrupt halt. The Italian troops were not equipped for an autumn campaign, their morale proved illusory and a determined counter-attack, launched in mid-November, began, very swiftly, to assume the proportions of a rout.
Although Hitler was quick to criticise his hapless ally for the severity of the defeat, he was not perhaps as opposed to the idea of a Balkan involvement as he might have appeared. The idea of a coordinated attack on Greece and an offensive in North Africa, aimed at the capture of Suez and thereby, imperilling Britainâs entire position, was not unattractive.
As early as the summer of 1940 German planners at both OKH 3 and OKW 4 , the top tiers of the Nazi command structure, had considered the possibility of supporting an Italian invasion of the Greek mainland with a simultaneous airborne assault on Crete. This would only be launched when Grazianiâs legions had succeeded in capturing Mersa Matruh in the second leg of the proposed desert offensive thus providing the Axis with forward airstrips and bringing the British fleet anchorage at Alexandria within bombing range.
The naval base at Souda Bay on the north coast of Crete, just east of the islandâs administrative capital, Chania, would be an invaluable asset in the war at sea, one which was presently available to the British. The scheme for proposed cooperation did not find favour with Il Duce who saw his dreams of imperial conquest coming to fruition purely as a result of Italian efforts, without the need for German intermeddling. As General Franz Halder sourly remarked, the Italians âdo not want usâ. 5
As the Germans were tentatively touting the idea of a combined Balkans operation, in August the Greeks, already alarmed by Italian sabre rattling and overt provocation, had approached the British ambassador requesting assistance in the event, as now appeared likely, of an invasion.
The subsequent report prepared by the Chiefs of Staff Committee and delivered to the War Cabinet on 9 September was unequivocal:
Even with the reinforcements at present contemplated, our land and air forces in the Middle East will be no more than sufficient to withstand a determined attack by Italian and German forces. Until the attack on Egypt has been finally defeated no forces will be available for assistance to Greece ⦠no forces can be made available for assistance to Greece until the present threat to Egypt has been liquidated. 6
The overwhelming
The Italians had some 280,000 men, supported by 1,500 aircraft; Wavellâs RAF support, headed by Sir Arthur Longmore, could barely muster 200 airworthy machines, many of these obsolete. Supply was by convoy taking the long route around the Cape of Good Hope and through the Red Sea, prone to attack by swift Italian destroyers and submarines. An overland air supply route over the trackless wastes of the Sahara was opened from Takoradi, each run an epic in itself.
In his directive of 16 August 1940 the Prime Minister stressed the vital importance of defending Egypt. Wavell certainly would not demur but he identified the overriding need, not for men but matériel, aircraft, trucks and tanks. Quite correctly he had judged that the war in the desert would be one that was decided by firepower and mobility, supported by superiority in the air. The Generalâs conclusions were accepted and the supply of equipment stepped up accordingly. Churchillâs bold idea of sending a convoy through the Axis-infested waters of the western Mediterranean, whilst extremely risky, paid off.
In Greece a great surge of patriotic fervour, sufficient to unite the many disparate factions, even under the leadership of a despised autocrat such as Metaxas, rallied and took on the Italian invaders. Despite a shortage of just about everything and a haphazard supply chain, the ill-armed Greek conscripts swiftly brought Mussoliniâs seemingly irresistible juggernaut to an abrupt halt. The Italian troops were not equipped for an autumn campaign, their morale proved illusory and a determined counter-attack, launched in mid-November, began, very swiftly, to assume the proportions of a rout.
Although Hitler was quick to criticise his hapless ally for the severity of the defeat, he was not perhaps as opposed to the idea of a Balkan involvement as he might have appeared. The idea of a coordinated attack on Greece and an offensive in North Africa, aimed at the capture of Suez and thereby, imperilling Britainâs entire position, was not unattractive.
As early as the summer of 1940 German planners at both OKH 3 and OKW 4 , the top tiers of the Nazi command structure, had considered the possibility of supporting an Italian invasion of the Greek mainland with a simultaneous airborne assault on Crete. This would only be launched when Grazianiâs legions had succeeded in capturing Mersa Matruh in the second leg of the proposed desert offensive thus providing the Axis with forward airstrips and bringing the British fleet anchorage at Alexandria within bombing range.
The naval base at Souda Bay on the north coast of Crete, just east of the islandâs administrative capital, Chania, would be an invaluable asset in the war at sea, one which was presently available to the British. The scheme for proposed cooperation did not find favour with Il Duce who saw his dreams of imperial conquest coming to fruition purely as a result of Italian efforts, without the need for German intermeddling. As General Franz Halder sourly remarked, the Italians âdo not want usâ. 5
As the Germans were tentatively touting the idea of a combined Balkans operation, in August the Greeks, already alarmed by Italian sabre rattling and overt provocation, had approached the British ambassador requesting assistance in the event, as now appeared likely, of an invasion.
The subsequent report prepared by the Chiefs of Staff Committee and delivered to the War Cabinet on 9 September was unequivocal:
Even with the reinforcements at present contemplated, our land and air forces in the Middle East will be no more than sufficient to withstand a determined attack by Italian and German forces. Until the attack on Egypt has been finally defeated no forces will be available for assistance to Greece ⦠no forces can be made available for assistance to Greece until the present threat to Egypt has been liquidated. 6
The overwhelming
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