Hitler's Jet Plane Read Online Free Page A

Me 262 airframe lasted the remainder of 1941.

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    Shortages, Technical Difficulties and the First Me 262 Crash
    T he chronic shortage of aviation spirit and materials for aircraft construction forced stringent economies including the halting of new developments considered speculative or whose completion was too far off. The Luftwaffe had been led to expect that it had until 1942 to equip for a major confrontation but in the event Germany had the dreaded scenario of war on two fronts once the Wehrmacht made its incursion into Soviet Russia on 21 June 1941. The day before, Hitler had ordered a reduction in the army and naval budget in favour of Luftwaffe armaments. Immediately following the announcement Goering demanded that the strength of the Luftwaffe be quadrupled and empowered his Secretary of State, Generalinspekteur Erhard Milch, to carry out the special task of establishing the capacity of the German aviation industry.
    Milch requested from Goering a written appointment as plenipotentiary and received by return a document endowing him with unique scope. There was practically nothing which lay outside his jurisdiction from the closing down of factories to the building of new ones.
    At that time aviation production was in a poor state and output was insufficient to cover combat losses. Factory managers blamed two factors: shortages of labour and aluminium. Milch had this allegation investigated and discovered scarce aluminium and aeronautical-quality sheet-plate was being diverted to non-aircraft processes. He also found that Udet had made a significant reduction in engine production and the output of bombers, particularly the He 111 and Ju 88, but that no new bomber type was scheduled for series production. Even the Me 210, an improved version of the Bf 110, would not be operational before October 1942.
    German intelligence was supplying horrendous reports regarding the rapidly growing production of aircraft in the still neutral United States and even Britain, where the factories were not disturbed by nightly enemy bombardment and could thus work at full output. Finally Milch learned that the new diveable bomber types would not be ready for operations before 1944.
    By now very perturbed, Milch took Udet with him to visit Messerschmitt at Augsburg for the purpose of investigating the situation respecting the Me 109F fighter. Director Rakan Kokothaki had sources in Berlin close to Udet and Milch and knew that both were highly displeased that so few fighters were rolling off the production line. They were most anxious for the new Me 109F with its Daimler – Benz 605 engine, which was still causing serious problems. Furthermore Kokothaki knew of Milch’s exasperation at the succession of new aircraft types at Augsburg at such a critical time, of which as Milch understood it there were at the time no fewer than twelve being worked upon by designers and engineers. Upon notification of the forthcoming visit, Kokothaki recalled advising his chief: ‘For God’s sake, under no circumstances mention any project other than the Me 109F, and particularly not the Me 262.’
    Milch and Udet arrived at the works on 7 August 1941. When awkward questions were posed at the very beginning of the tour of inspection about the series production of the Me 109F, Messerschmitt led his guests into another hall where he showed them Me 262 V1. He was convinced that at the first sight of the wonder aircraft they would forget the Me 109F. Milch went red in the face. His small mouth with its narrow lips pursed for a moment into an almost invisible line. Then he demanded, ‘What is the meaning of this, gentlemen? I have not come here to listen to music of the future but to find out how long you are going to keep us waiting to get the Me 109F operational. You are to concern yourselves exclusively with aircraft which we need right now and not with prototypes whose engines are not yet properly in order!’ (In August 1941, the 004A had just managed a