Finest Years Read Online Free Page A

482–3; army weakness compared with USA, 484; post-war world position, 519–20; weakness compared with USA, 519; differences with USA over post-liberation policies, 540–2; manpower problems, 546; coalition government dissolved, 577; general election (1945), 577–9, 584, 589; denied credit for atom bomb development, 587; produces few outstanding military commanders, 595
    Britain, Battle of (1940), 59, 79–81, 85, 97–9
    British Army: inaction, 114; WSC on limited role of, 115–16; based in Britain, 156; equipment shortages, 156; US low estimate of, 229; feeble performance, 240, 259–64; regimental system, 263–4; corrupt and indulgent practices, 264–5; leadership weaknesses, 264–7; inadequate armour and weaponry, 268–9; artillery excellence, 269; qualities of ordinary soldiers, 270–1; reputation after successes in North Africa, 341, 353; caution, 346; avoids heavy land battles, 369; Long Range Desert Group, 404, 407, 410, 415, 417; casualties in post-liberation Greece, 533; see also British Expeditionary Force Armies:
    First Army: in North African landings, 351
    Eighth Army: under Ritchie, 210; defeats, 262, 334; and recovery of disabled vehicles, 264; poor air support, 269; inactivity, 302; Montgomery appointed to command, 320; offensive under Montgomery, 336; advance in North Africa, 344–5, 352–3; WSC addresses at Castel Benito, 365; lands in Italy, 391
    British Empire: defeats, 234; WSC’s attitude to, 235–6, 597
    British Expeditionary Force: and German advance, 14, 16; prospective withdrawal, 17, 24–5; reinforcements withheld, 18; evacuates Arras, 19; attempts common front with French, 20–1; isolated, 22; evacuation from continent, 26, 30, 36–44, 67; proposed reconstitution in N.W. France, 38, 43, 45; equipment, 58
    Brittorous, Brig. Ben, 414
    Brooke, Gen. Sir Alan ( later 1st Viscount Alanbrooke): diary, xx, xxii; persuades WSC to withdraw British forces from N.W. France, xxi, 51–2; qualities and character, 14, 21; returns to France after evacuation, 43, 50–1; and WSC’s view of human nature, 57; succeeds Ironside as C.in C. Home Forces, 74; WSC’s apparent rudeness to, 89; on weak defences against prospective invasion, 96; witnesses WSC’s popularity, 98; on early defeats, 136; on role of Chiefs of Staff committee, 141; hostility to Sandys, 144–5; on training home-based army units, 156; resents Beaverbrook’s commitments to Russia, 165; succeeds Dill as CIGS, 210–12; relations with and view of WSC, 211, 252, 374, 380, 510, 521, 568–9, 593; on WSC’s temperament, 237; on army’s poor fighting, 239; at Casablanca conference, 259, 354–6; on poor army leadership, 265–6; and dismissal of Ritchie, 267; undervalues Lord Leathers, 275; meets Marshall urging second front, 283–4, 285; resists demands for early second front, 287, 312; quashes WSC’s plan to land in north Norway, 295; disbelieves German defence of Italy, 302; on ingratitude of Russians for aid, 304; meagre press coverage of, 307; criticises Julian Amery, 311; accompanies WSC to Middle East and Moscow, 315, 325–7, 329, 332; WSC proposes for command in Middle East, 318–19; recommends Montgomery to command Eighth Army, 320; on moments of doubt, 334; WSC complains to, 335; and conduct of battle of Alamein, 339; hopes for victory with success of Torch , 339; WSC congratulates after North African victories, 344; caution, 345, 350, 394;and WSC’s hopes for landing in Europe in 1943, 350; supports bombing campaign against Germany, 354; manner and abruptness, 356, 374; accompanies WSC to Turkey, 363–4; and employment of troops, 369; ignores events on Russian front, 373; at Washington Trident conference (1943), 378–9; accompanies WSC and Marshall to Algiers, 380; relief at Sicily success, 383; on American mistrust of British intentions over D-Day, 385; reservations over D-Day, 389, 393–4,