Canada in the Great Power Game 1914-2014 Read Online Free Page B

business of fighting foreign wars—and not too many Canadians were bothered by a little thing like a precedent.
    Long after the war, John Jefferson, who was then 99 years old, was asked why he had been eager to risk his life in South Africa: “I was young and foolish,” he said, “and I wanted adventure.” Then thoughtfully he added, “If I’d known then what I know now, I’d not have gone. I risked my life so that a few rich men could have full control of the gold and diamonds of the Transvaal. I was taken in by a lot of propaganda.”
    At the Forks of the Grand
, vol. 2

    Having persuaded the colonial prime ministers to contribute troops to the Boer War, Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain invited them all to another Imperial Conference in 1902. He now wanted to make the arrangement permanent by getting them to commit some of their forces to a special “Imperial Reserve” that would be available for service anywhere in the world.
    The weary Titan staggers under the too vast orb of its fate. We have borne the burden many years. We think it is time our children should assist us to support it.
    Joseph Chamberlain to the colonial prime ministers, Imperial Conference, London, 1902
    Canada’s contribution to the proposed Imperial Reserve would be one infantry brigade and one artillery brigade (about 4,500 men). That was only half the size of Australia’s, but Chamberlain charitably explained the discrepancy by observing that Australia didn’t have to worry about its own territory being invaded, whereas Canada had the United States next door. However, Laurier objected strongly to the whole idea, and the conference ended with no formal Canadian commitment.
    There is a school in England and in Canada, a school which is perhaps represented on the floor of this Parliament, a school which wants to bring Canada into the vortex of militarism which is the curse and the blight of Europe. I am not prepared to endorse any such policy.
    Sir Wilfrid Laurier to the House of Commons, Ottawa, before the Imperial Conference of 1902
    Laurier was equally unhelpful to the enthusiastic new British commander of the Canadian militia, Major-General the Earl of Dundonald, who was full of grand ideas for building new training areas and fortifications in Canada and raising the strength of the peacetime militia to 50,000, with provisions for expanding it instantly to 100,000 at the outbreak of war. He also wanted to make cadet corps compulsory in Canadian schools, in order to facilitate the further expansion of the Canadian army to 200,000 men in the early months of a war.
    It was all still allegedly in the context of defending Canada against an American attack, but it is hard to believe that Lord Dundonald was not also thinking of other possible uses for a large Canadian army. Laurier was not amused: “You must not take the militia seriously, for though it is useful for suppressing internal disturbances, it will not be required for the defence of the country, as the Monroe Doctrine protects us from enemy aggression.” By 1904 Dundonald had been dismissed, ostensibly for trying to stop political interference in militia affairs, but really for showingan excess of zeal. But despite Laurier’s refusal to make any overt military commitments to imperial defence, he found it impossible to resist the undertow that was drawing Canada into deeper waters. A new Liberal government in Britain had more success in implicating Canada in imperial defence by subtle means than Joseph Chamberlain had ever had with his direct appeals, and the militia budget crept inexorably upward, more than quadrupling between 1898 and 1911.
    It is hard to explain why this happened, for the key Canadian actors did not change. Laurier was prime minister continuously from 1896 to 1911, and his minister of militia throughout all fifteen years was Frederick Borden, a Nova Scotia physician, merchant and politician who combined a gregarious fondness for the social aspects of militia